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FREE SPEECH v. ABORTION: HAS THE FIRST
AMENDMENT BEEN EXPANDED,
LIMITED, OR BLURRED?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States today, the issues of the legality and morality
of abortion have sparked widespread controversy.' This controversy
has inflamed the passions of many otherwise reasonable persons2 and
caused them to take extraordinary actions 3 which, in some instances,
have yielded fatal consequences. 4 The situation has deteriorated such
that federal law enforcement officials have been called upon to protect some abortion clinics, 5 and federal, state, and municipal governments have considered enacting laws specifically for the protection of
abortion clinics. 6 The strength of belief on both sides of this controversy is reminiscent of the commitment of the Founding Fathers to the
cause of freedom when they wrote the Declaration of Independence.
Ironically, these passionate beliefs have forced the First Amendment
right of free speech7 into a direct confrontation with a woman's right
to abortion.'
1. See, e.g., David Ellison, Pro-Choice,Anti-Abortion Forces Gather To Make Their Cases,
Hous. PosT, Aug. 18, 1992, at A12; Jacquelynn Boyle, Abortion Wars BattlefrontMichigan, DET.
FaRE PRESS, May 10, 1992, at Fl.
2. See, e.g., Jim Naughton, The Faces of 2 Antiabortionists, 'A Pretty Normal' Life Contrasts With ConfrontationalStand, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 1991, at Dl.
3. See Ana Puga, Half of Abortion Clinics in Survey Report Hostile Acts, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 5, 1993, at 6; BettiJane Levine, The Torchingof Bakersfield's Only Abortion Clinic Leaves
City With Fewer Options, GreaterFears, L.A. Timis, Oct. 11, 1993, at El.
4. Judy Mann, Terrorism at the Clinics, WASH. PosT, Mar. 12, 1993, at E3 (discussing the
murder of abortion clinic physician David Gunn); Mark Silva, Tim Nickens, & Joanne Cavanaugh, From Gables Oddity to Pensacola Infamy Paul Hill Life of Extremes, MiAMI HERALD,
July 31, 1994, at Al (discussing the murder of abortion clinic physician John Britton).
5. See Mimi Hall & Steve Wieberg, US Joins Wichita Abortion Fray: Kansas Town "ied
Up" By Fierce Debate, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 1991, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, Administration Will Attempt to Make Obstructing Abortion
Clinics a Felony, WASH. PosT, Mar. 24, 1993, at A13; Peggy Lee, City To Draft Law To Restrict
Protestersat Clinics, L.A. TimEs, Dec. 1, 1993, at B6.
7. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
8. "[C]lash... between constitutional rights defined by the Supreme Court: an old one
tracing its roots to the speech clause of the First Amendment and before, and a new one stemming from Roe v. Wade." Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705,711 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1989)), overruled by
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). See also Abortion Clinics:Access and
Speech, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1993, at A18; Sandra Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike At Doctors'
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Recently, a group known as Operation Rescue has been actively
pursuing its stated goal of stopping abortions from being performed in
the United States. 9 In 1991, in Melbourne, Florida, the Aware Woman
Center for Choice, a clinic which performs abortions, was targeted by
Operation Rescue. 10
Prompted by the actions of Operation Rescue and others, Women's Health Center, Inc.," operator of the Aware Woman Center for
Choice, obtained injunctions restraining certain activities. 2 Arguably,
these injunctions affected the right of free speech 13 and were subsequently appealed by two different parties in separate courts.1 4 Because of these almost concurrent appeals, an uncommon situation
arose where two appellate courts, one federal and one state, almost
simultaneously rendered opposing decisions on the same issue.' 5 To
settle the differences between the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme 6Court, the United States
Supreme Court agreed to hear the matter.'
Although this case, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 7 is one of
free speech, its underlying connection to the issue of abortion only
Home Lives, Illegal Intimidationor Protected Protest?, WASH. Posr, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al. For a
discussion of the rights of abortion protestors and their victims, see Kelly L. Faglioni, Balancing

FirstAmendment Rights of Abortion ProtestorsWith The Rights Of Their 'ictims,'48 WASH. &
LEE L. Ruv. 347 (1991).
9. Operation Rescue America, Ed Martin, Judy Madsen ... are active in an organization known as "Operation Rescue America." In other areas of the United States, this
effort has been directed towards closing down abortion clinics throughout the country
.... Ed Martin has stated... he would love to shut down all abortion clinics.
Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 n.2 (Fla. 1993), affid in part sub
nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2416 (1994).
10. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667-70.
11. Women's Health Center operates a number of abortion clinics throughout central Florida, one of which is The Aware Woman Center for Choice. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114
S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994).
12. A temporary injunction was granted on October 25, 1991. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d
at 666. A permanent injunction was granted on September 30,1992. Id. An amended permanent
injunction was granted on April 8, 1993. ld. at 667.
13. "Operation Rescue challenges the propriety of only the amended injunction, raising
numerous issues under the United States Constitution:... freedom of speech.. . ." Id. at 669.
"Cheffer claimed that the injunction acted as a prior restraint on her free speech rights .... "
Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705,707 (11th Cir. 1993), overruled by Madsen v. Women's Health
Ctr., 114 S.Ct. 2516 (1994).
14. See infra part II.A.
15. See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (approving
the amended permanent injunction on October 28, 1993), affd in partsub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993)
(ruling on October 20, 1993 that Cheffer is entitled to a prohibition of enforcement of the
amended permanent injunction), overruled by Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994).
16. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516.
17. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
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fuels the controversy."8 Justice Scalia filed a strong dissent (concurring in part) to the Court's decision, 19 indicating that the matter may
not have been fully resolved.20 Considering the intensity of Justice
Scalia's dissent and the concurrence of two other Justices,21 this note
will examine the status of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause
in light of this decision. This note will also show that the Supreme
Court failed to make the clear statement needed to effectively resolve
the issue.
I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Facts

During 1991, Operation Rescue and others engaged in demonstrations and other related activities in front of the Aware Woman
Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida, where abortions were performed. 22 Judy Madsen was one of the pro-life participants in the
demonstrations. 23 In response to these actions, Women's Health
Center applied for an injunction. 24 On October 25, 1991, the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court of Seminole County, Florida, granted a
temporary injunction imposing a number of restrictions on Operation Rescue and others.2 6 On September 30, 1992, the court entered a
18. "[F]ew Americans are content with the current legal status of abortion .... Cheffer v.
McGregor, 3 F.3d 705, 706 (11th Cir. 1993), overruled by Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114
S.Ct. 2516 (1994). "The entire injunction in this case departs so far from the established course of
our jurisprudence that in any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for
summary reversal. But the context here is abortion." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2534 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
19. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2534-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. See discussion infra part IV.
21. Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530-31 (Souter, J. concurring). Justice Stevens filed an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part. Id. at 2531-34
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). These opinions will not be addressed in this
note.
22. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
23. See id.
24. See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in
part sub nor. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
25. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 666.
26. The court enjoined any person or persons from: trespassing on, sitting on, or blocking
or obstructing the entrance or exit, or any person seeking access to or leaving any facility where
abortions or family planning services were being performed in Seminole, Brevard, and surrounding counties in the state of Florida; physically abusing persons entering, leaving, working at or
using such facilities; and from directing or attempting to direct others to take any such actions.
Id. at 666 n.1.
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permanent injunction2 7 based on certain findings of fact. 28 The permanent injunction imposed a number of restrictions, mirroring those
of the temporary injunction.29
As a result of the continuing and expanding activities of Operation Rescue and others and the lack of protection provided by the
permanent injunction, Women's Health Center applied for sanctions
and modification of the permanent injunction. 0 After three days of
hearings and the presentation of evidence,3 ' the court made a number
of findings32 and conclusions.33 On April 8, 1993, the court amended
the permanent injunction and significantly expanded its scope. 4 The
27. Ild. at 666.
28. The court found that the respondents were individuals and organizations, acting in concert, who planned a nationwide campaign called "Operation Rescue," which was directed towards closing down abortion clinics and providers nationwide. ld. at 666 n.3. The court further
found that the respondents' intention was to close down "abortion mills" by encircling them with
large numbers of protestors and blocking access to the facilities. Id. In addition, the court found
that some of the respondents had been involved in such activities in other parts of the country,
that they intended to conduct these actvities in Florida, and that their members should ignore
state laws and police officers. Id.
29. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667 nA. See also supra text accompanying note 27.
30. Id. at 676.
31. Id.
32. Some of the court's findings were: 1) there had been interference with access to the
Aware Woman's Clinic and vehicular traffic in the area had been interrupted by a crowd of up to
400 persons; 2) some of the crowd were members of Operation Rescue; 3) noise from the crowd,
including shouting, yelling, and the use of sound amplification equipment, could be heard inside
the clinic and caused stress to patients; 4) the crowd remained primarily in the public right of
way, but approached vehicles turning into the clinic driveway and pushed literature through the
windows of the vehicles; 5) respondents followed patients and staff of the clinic, and contacted
them and their minor children at their residences, as well as contacting neighbors and passing
out literature describing the staff and patients as "baby killers;" 6) a staff physician was followed
by an associate of respondents who pretended to shoot at the physician, causing the physician to
terminate his employment with the clinic; 7) multiple telephone calls were made to the clinic,
jamming the phone lines and preventing their use for emergencies; and 8) the crowd caused
some patients to turn away from the clinic. Id. at 676-78.
33. These conclusions included: 1) that respondents and those in concert continued to impede access to the clinic and that the public right-of-way must be kept open; 2) that noise from
the crowd should be limited and restrained; 3) that respondents' actions at the residences of the
clinic staff was impermissible and should be limited and restrained; 4) that interfering in the
telephone service of the clinic is impermissible and should be restrained; 5) that the following of
the clinic staff and patients by the respondents was impermissible conduct and should be restrained; and 6) that respondents' rights to demonstrate and speak freely should be recognized
and protected. Id. at 678-79.
34. Respondents were permanently enjoined from: 1) enteriilg the premises and property
of the clinic; 2) blocking, impeding, inhibiting, obstructing or interfering with ingress or egress to
the clinic-, 3) congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering the public right-ofway or private property within a thirty-six-foot radius of the property line of the clinic, with
certain exceptions; 4) singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, and using bullhorns, auto
horns, sound amplification equipment, or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot
of persons inside the clinic during the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through
Saturdays (surgical and recovery periods); 5) within 300 feet of the clinic, physically approaching
any person seeking the clinic's services, unless such approach is invited, in which case the communication must be non-threatening and cannot be within the thirty-six-foot buffer zone; 6) at all
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major provisions of this modified permanent injunction, which were
subsequently addressed by the United States Supreme Court, included: 1) a prohibition against noise near the clinic; 2) a thirty-sixfoot buffer zone around the clinic encompassing both public and private property; 3) a three-hundred-foot no-approach zone around the
clinic prohibiting protestors from approaching clinic patients; 4) a
three-hundred-foot zone around the residences of clinic employees
where protesting and demonstrations were prohibited; and 5) a prohi35
bition against objectionable images observable around the clinic.
Operation Rescue appealed the amended permanent injunction
to Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, which certified the cause
to the Florida Supreme Court, and review was granted.36 The appeal
raised, inter alia, the allegation that the amended permanent injunction violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 37 The Florida Supreme Court, acknowledging the great public importance of the issue and the need for immediate resolution, 38 heard the appeal and upheld the amended
permanent injunction by order dated October 28, 1993. 39
During the same time period, Myrna Cheffer, a pro-life activist,
filed a separate application in United States District Court to enjoin
enforcement of the amended permanent injunction, claiming that the
injunction restrained her right to free speech.4 ° Cheffer claimed that
she had not been working in concert with Operation Rescue, although
she was apparently present during at least one of Operation Rescue's
demonstrations in front of the clinic.4 1 Her application was denied by
times, approaching, congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or using sound amplification equipment within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff and employees and blocking,
inhibiting, or impeding access to the driveways or streets where the residences are located; 7) at
all times, physically abusing, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving,
crowding, or assaulting persons entering or leaving the clinic or homes of the staff, employees, or
patients of the clinic; 8) at all times, harassing, intimidating, physically abusing, assaulting, or
threatening any present or former staff member or employees; and 9) at all times, encouraging,
inciting, or securing others to perform these prohibited acts. Id. at 679-81.
35. Id at 679-80.
36. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 621 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1993).
37. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 669 (Fla. 1993), aff d in part
sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
38. Id. at 666.
39. Id. at 664.
40. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705,707 (11th Cir. 1993), overruledby Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
41. "On April 11, 1993, approximately 50 apparently 'pro-life' individuals were arrested for
entering the buffer zone. Myrna Cheffer was not among them." Id. The case does not explicitly
state whether Cheffer was ever present during the demonstrations. See id. at 708.
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the district court. 42 Cheffer subsequently appealed the denial to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated the district court's
order and remanded the matter for further consideration by order
dated October 20, 1993, eight days before the order of the Florida
Supreme Court. 43
To resolve the conflict between the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court concerning the
constitutionality of the amended permanent injunction, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
B. Issues Presented
For the purposes of this note, there were two issues presented to
the United States Supreme Court in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center.4 5 The first was the constitutionality of the amended permanent injunction ordered by the Florida Circuit Court, particularly regarding the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 6 The
second was the resolution of the differences between the decisions of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court
regarding that injunction. 47
C. The Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Florida Supreme Court which upheld the amended permanent injunction.4 8 The noise restrictions and the thirty-six-foot
buffer zone on public property of the injunction were upheld.49 The
thirty-six-foot buffer zone on private property, the three-hundred-foot
no-approach zone, and the three-hundred-foot residential buffer zone
were struck down." By its decision, the Supreme Court overruled the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which had ordered the district
court to reconsider its refusal to overturn the injunction.51
42. Id. at 708.
43. Id. at 712.
44. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994).
45. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
46. See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in
part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
47. See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705,707 (11th Cir. 1993), overruled by Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 664.
48. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2522 (1994), affg in part Operation
Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993).
49. Id. at 2530.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2523.
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HI. TiHE

DECISION

The decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center was, for the

most part, in accordance with established law.52 However, the Court
appeared timid in upholding the injunction by failing to uphold certain portions of the injunction which protected abortion rights. 53 Was
this due to the complexity of the issue or the Court's reluctance to
address abortion fights? In practicality, the Supreme Court had to
accept the case because of the nearly simultaneous conflicting deci54
sions of the Eleventh Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court.
Although the Court claimed to have presented a "new" test to evaluate injunctions in the context of the First Amendment, Justice Scalia's
dissent accurately criticizes the lack of "new" aspects in this test. 55
A.

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court rejected the Petitioners' claim that, because
the injunction restricted only the speech of the anti-abortion protesters, it was content-based and should be subjected to the strictest scrutiny.5 6 Content-neutrality of a regulation, stated the Court, is judged
according to the content of the regulated speech. 57 Content-based regulations have been defined as regulations which "restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content...."
Because the injunction was directed against the Petitioners' conduct
(which included repeated violations of the original injunction), and
5
not the content of their message, the injunction was content-neutral. 1
The mere fact that all those affected by the injunction held similar
views was insufficient to invalidate the injunction. 59 Had this matter
involved a content-neutral statute, given that the location was a traditional public forum (a public sidewalk), 60 the Court stated that, in

such a situation, it would use the standard of regulation of time, place,
52. The Court did not create new law in Madsen, in spite of the "new" test presented. See
discussion infra parts III.A., IV.
53. See generally infra part III.A.
54. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705,711 (11th Cir. 1993), overruled by Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664
(Fla. 1994), affd in part sub nonm Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
55. See generally, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2534 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
56. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
57. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) and Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
58. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
59. Id. at 2524 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
60. Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988)).
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and manner "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
'61
interest.
As is evident from their lack of logic, improperly equating the
chance circumstance of similar beliefs with intentional actions on their
parts, the Petitioners' argument was invalid. The Court appropriately
rejected this part of their claim.62 Although it may be argued that the
Court's justification is merely a "cover" for ruling against the protestors' speech content, the decision does not reflect any particular prohibition of the message itself. Thus, the Petitioners' argument does not
appear to have merit in fact or in logic. Indeed, given the conservative
bent to the Court, 63 it would seem that the Court might be expected to
favor the protestors.
However, the Court did acknowledge that there are obvious differences between an injunction and a statute.' 4 Although injunctions
carry a greater risk of censorship and discrimination than statutes, 5
injunctions have the advantage of providing precise relief where a violation has already occurred.66
The Court has stated in the past that it has been content to rely
on general principles to ensure that an injunction was not overly
broad 67 and that injunctive relief was "no more burdensome to the
defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffS."' 68 Because of the differences between an injunction and a statute, the Court stated that the standard time, place, and manner
analysis 69 was insufficient when evaluating content-neutral injunctions
in the context of the First Amendment.7 ° This indicates that precision
61. Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) and Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
62. Id. at 2523.
63. See generally W. John Moore, High Court's Conservatives are in Charge, NAT'L J., July
8, 1995, at 1772; Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court; Conservative United States Supreme
Court, NEw REPUaLTC, July 31, 1995, at 19.

64. A statute represents a legislative choice of interests and an injunction is a remedy for an
actual or threatened violation of a legislative or judicial decree. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953)).
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
67. Ld.at 2524-25 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Carroll
v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); and Milk Wagon Drivers
Union of Chicago Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941)).
68. Madsen v. women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994) (quoting Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
69. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983)). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989).
70. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
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of regulation is demanded. 7 Instead of the previous standard for injunctions, the Court presented a new standard in this context, requiring: 1) a significant government interest and 2) that speech is
burdened no more than necessary. 72
A close examination of this new standard will show no significant
differences between it and the time, place, and manner standard
presented in United States v. Grace.73 Although Grace does not specifically incorporate the "speech is burdened no more than necessary"
aspect, this part is implicitly addressed in the other parts of the Grace
test.74 So why the new standard? And why was the time, place, and
manner standard not sufficiently precise? Thus, in this author's opinion, the Court does not present a valid justification for this conclusion.
Under the first part of this new standard, the Court reiterated the
significant government interests stated by the Florida Supreme Court
protecting: 1) a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical assistance
regarding pregnancy;75 2) public safety, order, the free flow of traffic,
and property rights;76 3) residential privacy; 77 and 4) medical privacy. 78 The Court found these interests sufficient to justify the injunction;79 however, the Court may have understated their importance.
Privacy rights should be, and are, considered to be fundamental.8 0
Therefore, these government interests should merit classification as
compelling, and not just significant, government interests. It appears
that the Court was laying the foundation for its half-hearted affirmation of the injunction by its demeaning classification of these rights.
71. Id. (referring to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (requiring "precision of regulation")).
72. Id. at 2525. Further, the Court stated that "a standard requiring that an injunction 'burden no more speech than necessary' exemplifies 'precision of regulation."' Id.
73. 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
74. In Grace, the Court stated that under the First Amendment, regulations are subject to
"reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions...." Grace, 461 U.S. at 183-84. The Court was
urged to consider the regulation at issue a reasonable place restriction "having only a minimal
impact on expressive activity," but ultimately held that the regulation was not a reasonable place
" Id. at 180restriction because it had an "insufficient nexus with any of the public interests ....
81.
75. Madsen v. women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (Leonard W. Levy et al.
eds., 1971).
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Under the second element of this new test, the Court found the
thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the public property the injunction
encompassed to be constitutional. 81 Although the Court acknowledged that the need for a complete buffer zone was debatable, the
Court deferred to the state court.8 Because the Court addressed almost every other aspect of the matter, it appears that it sidestepped
this issue to prevent additional controversy being raised over an already difficult decision.
Further, the Court acknowledged that the failure of a first injunction can be considered when evaluating the constitutionality of a
broader order.83 However, because the purposes of the injunction
were, inter alia, to protect access to the clinic and the orderly flow of
traffic,' and because neither purpose was disturbed by activity on the
private property encompassed by the injunction, that portion of the
injunction was found more burdensome than necessary and
invalidated. 85
Regarding the public property, the decision was sound because
there is an obligation on the part of the government to protect the
public and the rights of its citizens on public property. However, the
decision appears faulty concerning the private property. Although the
Court acknowledged the purposes of access and order, it conveniently
ignored the rights under Roe v. Wade,86 which were apparently still
being violated on private property by the protestors. 87 Thus, this deci88 could be construed
sion, in addition to Casey v. PlannedParenthood,
to be a veiled attempt to further limit the holdings of Roe.
The Court found that the noise restrictions required by the injunction were constitutional in that they burdened "no more speech
than necessary to ensure the health and well-being of the patients at
the clinic."89 The Court noted that, even under the previous standard,
81. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2526-27 (1994) (citing Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (upholding a statute which prohibited picketing which obstructed
access/egress to/from public buildings)).
82. Id.at 2527.
83. Id.(citing National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978)),
84. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in part
sub nom., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
85. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
88. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).

89. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2528 (1994).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss1/6

10

Plouffe: Free Speech v. Abortion: Has the First Amendment Been Expanded, L

1995]

FREE SPEECHv. ABORTION

similar noise restrictions had been upheld. 90 However, the "images
observable" part of the injunction was held invalid because the clinic
curtains could easily be drawn to avoid the disagreeable signs and
placards. 91
Past rulings acknowledge the legitimacy of noise restrictions.9'
This part of the Court's decision exonerates the part which refused to
extend the buffer zone to private property. 93 As long as the persons
on the private property are quiet, whatever is done on that private
property is acceptable. Thus, the private property owners' rights are
protected and, as the Court stated, the clinic can merely draw the curtains to prevent disagreeable images from being seen.94 The Court's
invalidation of the "images observable" part of the injunction was
appropriate.
Concerning the three-hundred-foot no-approach zone, the Court
recognized that protecting people from being "stalked" or
"shadowed" was legitimate. 95 However, prohibiting all uninvited approaches of persons going to and from the clinic, no matter how
peaceful, was difficult to justify unless the speech was "so infused with
violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm."9 6
As the evidence at the hearings (the video-tape of the protestors97 )
apparently indicated, there was not a significant amount of violence
involving the protestors in front of the clinic. 98 Thus, the Court was
justified in rejecting the part of the injunction banning all approaches
to persons using the clinic. 99 The invalidation'01 of this portion of the

injunction is further supported by the Court's past rulings that persons
may have to tolerate insulting and outrageous speech, 10 1 and that, to
ban all speech, the speech must be "so infused with violence as to be
90. 1d. The Court has upheld similar injunctions around schools and hospitals. See, e.g.,

NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773, 783-84 n.12 (1979) (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB,
437 U.S. 438,509 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
116 (1972).
91. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529.
92. See Baptist Hospital,442 U.S. at 783-84, n.12 (1979); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 (1972).

93. See supra text accompanying note 86.
94. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529.
95. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 (referring to International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness
v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2708 (1992) (indicating that "face-to-face solicitation presents risks of
duress that are an appropriate target of regulation")).
96. Id. at 2529.
97. See iL at 2527.
98. Id. at 2537.
99. See id. at 2529.
100. "[I]t burdens more speech than is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic." Id.
101. Id. (quoting Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
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indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm.'1 0 2 Such was pre-

sumably not the case in Madsen. The Court could have, but apparently did not, use the overbreadth doctrine to overturn this part of the
injunction. °3
Regarding the three-hundred-foot zone prohibition against picketing in the residential areas of the clinic employees, the Court stated
that the ban was too broad. 0 4 The Court noted that the sanctity of
the home had been recognized in a previous case 105 but that the ban
upon residential picketing was limited to that "focused ...

solely in

front of a particular residence."' 1 6 The picketing was not so focused
in Madsen, °7 thus, the Court properly ruled in accordance with established law by denying this portion of the injunction. However, because of the Court's previous recognition of the sanctity of the home,
the Respondents might have success reapplying for a more limited restriction for just the residences of the clinic employees.
Even so, accepting that the decision of the Court was within the
boundaries of established law regarding the three-hundred-foot noapproach zone, was the decision correct? Since the activities of the
protestors actually prevented some people from going to the clinic,
and because of the expected emotional turmoil and physical problems
women will likely have when seeking an abortion, it is apparent that
women deserve more protection than the Court provided. The Court
could have just as easily upheld the three-hundred-foot no-approach
zone without infringing upon the First Amendment rights of the
protestors. Any person approaching the clinic would, no doubt, have
seen the pro-life picketers and clearly understood their message,
whether the picketers were thirty feet away or three hundred feet
away.
The Court rejected the Petitioners' claims of vagueness and overbreadth of the injunction as applicable to those "acting in concert,"
because the Petitioners were named parties and did not have standing
102. Id. (citing Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287

(1941)).
103. The overbreadth doctrine is succinctly stated as: "[O]ne that is designed to burden or
punish activities which are not constitutionally protected, but [that] includes within its scope
activities which are protected by the First Amendment." Hill v. City of Houston, 764 F.2d 1156,
1161 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting JOHN NOWAK ET AL, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722
(1978)).
104. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
105. "[T]he unique nature of the home, as 'the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the
sick."' Id. at 2529 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)).

106. Id. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483).
107. Id.
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to challenge an order inapplicable to them. 08 Citing Regal Knitwear
Co. v. NLRB, 10 9 the Court dismissed the Petitioners' claims as being
"an abstract controversy over the use of these words.""' However,
the Court apparently erred in this matter by failing to acknowledge
the authority cited by the Eleventh Circuit which indicated that litigants may challenge regulations which do not violate their own rights
of freedom of expression."' Indeed, the Court did not present any
authority which countered that cited by the Eleventh Circuit. 1 2
In summary, the majority: 1) upheld the noise restrictions; 2) upheld the thirty-six-foot buffer zone on public property; 3) struck down
the thirty-six-foot buffer zone on private property; 4) struck down the
three-hundred-foot no-approach zone; and 5) struck down the threehundred-foot buffer zone around the residences." 3 One major problem with this decision is the Court's failure to acknowledge that certain rights, such as the right to privacy 1 4 and a woman's rights
concerning medical care during pregnancy," 5 may be protected more
appropriately by an injunction." 6 This is not to say that these rights
are superior to the right of free speech, but the Court could have
given additional, deserved consideration of them in its balancing of
competing interests." 7 There is little doubt that the pro-life movement will use this apparent flaw in the decision as ammunition in its
future attacks upon the pro-choice movement.
B. Justice Scalia's Dissent"'
Justice Scalia may have been correct when he noted that the decision would have been different if the subject had been anything but
108. Id
109. 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
110. Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2530 (quoting Regal Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14-15).
111. See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 708-09 (11th Cir. 1993), (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Assoc., 484 U.S. 383 (1988)), overruled by Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114

S.Ct. 2516 (1994).
112. The Court did cite Regal Knitwear. However, it can be argued that Regal Knitwear is
not applicable to Madsen and does not sufficiently counter the argument of the 11th Circuit
because the case cited by the 11th Circuit, Virginia v. American Booksellers Assoc., 484 U.S. 383
(1988), was more recent and directly applicable to the First Amendment.
113. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
114. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Tr RIGHT OF PRIVACY (Leonard W.
Levy et al. eds., 1971).
115. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
116. Where a statute mandating such limits would likely be struck down as overbroad, an
injunction can be used for specific unique circumstances such as those in this matter.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
118. Justice Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part to the Madsen judgment. Madsen
v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S.Ct 2516, 2550 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
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abortion. 119 However, he was incorrect in that the difference would
likely have been that the majority would have ruled more strongly in
favor of the injunction, protecting violated rights, instead of upholding
only portions of it. 2 °
Justice Scalia's first criticism of the ruling, stating that the differences between a statute and an injunction should be grounds for strict
scrutiny,' 2 ' appears to have some merit because of the fundamental
nature of the rights of the patients which were being protected.122
Any prohibition of fundamental rights should be subjected to strict
scrutiny.'" However, the first reason he presented to justify this position is questionable. Justice Scalia stated that the same dangers present with content-based speech-restricting statutes are invariably
present with speech-restricting injunctions (whether content-based or
content-neutral). 24 He argued that, because an injunction lends itself
to the suppression of particular ideas and frequently suppresses a particular view, injunctions are invariably speech restricting.'2
Justice Scalia's logic appears faulty for the following reasons.
First, just because injunctions generally lend themselves to abuse does
not mean that all injunctions deserve strict scrutiny.' 26 Second, Justice
Scalia claimed that injunctions may be used as readily as statutes to
suppress particular views. 2 7 This claim is inaccurate. When injunc-

tions are properly executed for proper purposes, the speech is almost
never suppressed, but is usually controlled according to certain established principles, such as restrictions on time, place, and manner of
expression.'2 Third, Justice Scalia's first reason is illogical because
part). However, his concurrence was restricted to the parts of the injunction which were struck
down; he dissented to "that portion of the judgment upholding parts of the injunction." Id.
Because he was opposed to upholding any part of the injunction, this note will refer to his
opinion only as a dissent.
119. "[I]n any other context [this case] would have been regarded as a candidate for summary reversal." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2534.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 2538.
122. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
123. 2 RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 15.7
(1986).
124. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id.

126. Using the same logic, it can be argued that because governments lend themselves to
tyranny, all governments should be subject to strict scrutiny. It is unlikely that the government
or Justice Scalia would tolerate such an idea.
127. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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his premises are possibilities, yet his conclusion is an absolute. 12 9 Further, Justice Scalia failed to consider the substantial overbreadth doctrine as stated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,30 which held that where a
statute is merely susceptible of application to protected speech it may
be constitutional unless it substantially interferes with a protected
right.' 3 ' Justice Scalia failed to demonstrate in his argument any substantial interference with free speech.
The second reason offered by Justice Scalia, the potential abuse
by a single judge, 32 appears facially valid; however, Justice Scalia
failed to consider two facts. First, the ruling of a judge is almost always subject to the appellate procedure, 33 as has been shown in this
case. Any improper injunction would be subject to review and reversal by an impartial appellate court which would not be affected, as
may be the granting judge, by disobedience to the first order. Second,
judges are presumed to be impartial," 3 yet Justice Scalia's argument
indicates that he would presume the judge to be biased. 35 Further,
Justice Scalia, in another section of his dissent, noted that judges are
granted significant leeway, yet apparently he does not acknowledge
judicial leeway in this part of his dissent. 36 It is illogical to argue a
point both ways and expect to win both arguments.
Although Justice Scalia argued that legislation is subject to strict
scrutiny because it lends itself to suppressing ideas, he cites no authority directly stating this proposition. 37 A more realistic appraisal of
the reasons legislation is subject to strict scrutiny indicates that: 1)
compared to injunctions, legislation is relatively permanent and meore
difficult to overturn, and 2) legislation affects the entire population

129. Justice Scalia used the word "invariably," which logically leaves no possibility for another result. Such an absolute conclusion cannot be logically drawn from premises presenting
mere possibilities.
130. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
131. Id.at 615.
132. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2539 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Se eg., Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993), overruled by Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988) (requiring that a judge disqualify himself when impartiality can be reasonably questioned).
135. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539.
136. See id, at 2539-40.
137. A close reading of this section of Justice Scalia's dissent seems to indicate that he is
improperly linking the legislative "intent" referred to in the cases he cites to the "possibility" of
idea suppression. See iL at 2539.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995

15

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31:203

whereas an injunction only affects a particular person or group, for
which there is usually just cause to regulate. 38
Justice Scalia's claim that the injunction was content-based because of its residual coverage of those acting in concert with the
named parties 139 is fallacious. He stated that if the injunction was directed at just "those who did certain things . . . then the injunction's
residual coverage of 'all persons acting in concert or participation
with' [the named individuals and organizations],... would not include
those who merely entertained the same beliefs and wished to express
the same views .... ," Justice Scalia failed to point out that the
41
terms of the injunction included those persons "acting in concert."'
The key word is "acting." The injunction did not mandate the arrest
of those with similar beliefs as Justice Scalia would have readers beonly those who acted in certain ways prohibited
lieve. 42 It addressed
143
by the injunction.
The three samples from the hearings, selected by Justice Scalia to
support his position, were misleading. The first presented a man complaining that his arrest for being in the thirty-six-foot buffer zone in
violation of the injunction was selective."44 The judge explained that
he was arrested for being in concert. 45 The judge did not say he was
arrested for his beliefs. 4 6 The terms of the injunction applied to those
acting in concert with the named parties. 47 Apparently, Justice Scalia
considered the judge's explanation of the man's arrest an explanation
of the judge's construction of the injunction. A comparison of the
judge's order, which acknowledges the free speech rights of the named
parties, 48 to this sample 49 will illustrate that this sample was interpreted out of context.
138. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (referring to United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
632-33 (1953)).
139. Id. at 2539 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2539-40.
141. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
142. See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 679-81 (Fla. 1993), aff'd
in part sub nor. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2540 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 n.1 (Fla. 1993), affd
in part sub nor. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
148. "[R]espondents shall have the right to congregate, demonstrate and freely express
Id. at 681.
themselves ....
149. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2540 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The second sample presented by Justice Scalia 150 was also misleading. The person speaking with the judge, John Doe #16, stated
"the reason why I was arrested was because I acted in concert with
those who were demonstrating pro-life."'' Note that the acknowl52
edged reason for Doe's arrest was that he was acting,1
not what he
believed or what he spoke. In the same sample, the judge acknowledged that the injunction would only apply to those who were prolife.' 53 This merely repeated the essence of the injunction. 54 What is
not presented with this sample is the acknowledgement that the only
persons who were violating the injunction (i.e., acting in violation)
were those who were pro-life; the pro-choice people were not acting
in such a manner as to merit an injunction.' 5 5 This sample does not
support Justice Scalia's position that the injunction was content56
based.
The third sample presented John Doe #31 questioning the court
about his arrest. 57 The judge responded by stating "[t]hey observed
your activities and determined in their minds whether or not what you
were doing was in concert with.., named Defendants.' 1 58 The key
word is doing. The police observed John Doe #31's activities, not what
he believed and not what he spoke. Therefore, Justice Scalia's position that the injunction was content-based is not supported by this
example; in fact, all three of these samples actually support the majority opinion.
Regarding the heavy presumption against injunctions restricting
free speech as prior restraints, 59 Justice Scalia quoted Organization
16 1
for a Better Austin v. Keefe160 to illustrate the injunction's invalidity.
In Keefe, the injunction was vacated, due in part to the lack of any
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664,666 n.6 (Fla. 1993), affd
in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
155. See generally id. at 676-78.
156. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2540.
158. Id

159. "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308,
317 (1980) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). See also Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,558 (1976); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971).
160. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
161. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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privacy rights. 162 However, in Madsen the majority cites the presence
of, inter alia, privacy rights.' 63 This fact invalidates Justice Scalia's
argument.
Justice Scalia presented a series of cases which he stated have
struck down injunctions where the burden has not been met. 64 However, in Youngdahl v. Rainfair,Inc.,165 one of the cases presented, the
injunction was not entirely vacated. 66 The part that was upheld 1in67
volved the prohibition of obstruction, provocation, and violence.
The part that was vacated prohibited peaceful activities unconnected
to the violence. 68 In National Socialist Party of America v. Village of
Skokie, 69 the issue before the Supreme Court was not an injunction,
but the denial of a stay pending appeal of the injunction.' 70 The Court
ruled that the Illinois Supreme Court must provide immediate appellate review; it did not overturn the injunction.' 7' In Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart,72 at issue was a prohibition of reporting certain
aspects of a criminal trial.' 73 The entire injunction was not, in principle, struck down.' 7 4 The only part that was invalidated was information which could be gained from public hearings and other sources.' 75
In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,' 76 the injunction was struck
down not because of failure to meet the heavy burden to support it,
but because the statute authorizing the injunction failed to provide
adequate safeguards for entry and review of such orders. 7 7 Justice
162.
163.
164.
165.

See Keefe, 402 U.S. at 418-20.
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24.
Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
355 U.S. 131 (1957).

166. "Accordingly, insofar as the injunction before us prohibits... it is affirmed." Id. at 139.
167. "[P]rohibits petitioners and others cooperating with them from threatening violence
against, or provoking violence on the part of,... prohibits them from obstructing or attempting
to obstruct the free use of the streets ...... Id.

168. "On the other hand, to the extent the injunction prohibits all other picketing and patrolling of respondent's premises and in particular prohibits peaceful picketing, it is set aside." Id. at
139-40.
169. 432 U.S. 43 (1977).

170. Id. at 44.
171. Id.
172. 427 U.S. 539 (1971).
173. Id. at 541.

174. The Supreme Court overturned the injunction only in regards to reporting on public
hearings and material gained from other sources. Id. at 570. The Court used the terms "To the
extent," indicating that some aspects of the order were not overturned. Id.
175. Id.
176. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).

177. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the absence of
any special safeguards governing the entry and review of orders restraining the exhibition of named or unnamed motion pictures.... precludes the enforcement of these
nuisance statutes .... [T]he Court of Appeals did not hold that there can never be a
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Scalia's use of these cases to attack the injunction is questionable. In
the instant case, as in each of these cases cited, part of the injunction
has been struck down.' 7 8 Is it Justice Scalia's intent that the instant
injunction should be entirely struck down because a portion of it is
invalid? These cases support the majority's decision upholding part
and striking part of the injunction and do not support Justice Scalia's
dissent.
Justice Scalia's criticism that there was not sufficient accompanying violence 179 is questionable. He cited Youngdahl v. Rainfair,Inc. to
justify his position.'80 However, the Youngdahl decision, which overturned the part of the injunction prohibiting peaceful picketing,' 8 '
noted that the State had entered the pre-empted federal domain of
the National Labor Relations Board,' s 2 which constitutes independent
grounds for overturning a State decision. Although the Youngdahl
decision indicated that the nature of some of the speech was likely to
provoke violence, 8 3 the Court found that the peaceful picketing was
not sufficiently connected to the violence.'" The often close connection between speech and intimidation, provocation, and violence, applied to the facts of Madsen, where clinic employees were stalked,
shadowed, threatened, and subsequently fearful, indicates that Justice
Scalia's criticism concerning the lack of violence is invalid.
Justice Scalia claimed that the case presented by the majority,
Carrollv. President & Commissioner of PrincessAnne,"s did not support the majority opinion because it presented the standard of strict
scrutiny.' 8 6 This claim is in error. Apparently, Justice Scalia relied on
the presence of the word "narrowest" in the Carrolldecision to justify
his interpretation of the Carroll standard as strict scrutiny." s However, Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, s8s shows that the word "narrowly" is used in both the contentvalid prior restraint ... [but] simply held that these Texas statutes were procedurally
deficient ....

Vance, 445 U.S. at 317.
178. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
179. Id. at 2541-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. ld. (citing Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957)).
181. Youngdahl, 355 U.S. at 139-40.
182. Id. at 139.
183. See Id. at 138-39.
184. 1& at 139.
185. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
186. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2542 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. "An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms ....
Id.
188. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:203

based test (strict scrutiny) and the content-neutral test.18 9 This invalidates Justice Scalia's criticism. Further, Justice Scalia apparently
failed to consider that a new constitutional test will usually not be
completely and specifically stated by previous authorities; that is why
it is a "new" test.
Justice Scalia's attempt to demonstrate the invalidity of the majority's new test by employing it' 90 was unconvincing. He cited portions of Parts A, E, and I of the amended permanent injunction to
illustrate that there was no intentional or purposeful obstruction by
the Petitioners. 191 However, he failed to mention Part D, which stated
that on at least one occasion the police had to barricade one lane of
traffic because of the number of people. 9 He failed to mention Part
H, which stated that a doctor from the clinic was delayed by the Petitioners at his residence. 93 He failed to mention Part J, which stated
that a doctor from the clinic was not just delayed by the Petitioners'
actions, but left employment with the clinic.' 94 He failed to mention
the last portion of Part I, which stated that patients had turned away
from the clinic because of the actions of the Petitioners. 95 Finally,
although presented, he failed to acknowledge the portion of Part A
which stated that the Petitioners were traversing the driveway entrances and forcing traffic to stop.' 96 Since intent is an element whose
presence can be inferred' 97 and since these facts show a foundation
for such an inference, Justice Scalia's attempt to show lack of intent
fails.
Justice Scalia's characterization of the Petitioners' actions as
"mild interference" is amazing. 198 Would Justice Scalia be so cavalier
if one of his fellow Justices had recently been murdered by protestors' 99 and another 200
protestor subsequently approached him and
mimed shooting him?
189. Id. at 45.
190. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2544-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2545.
192. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 677 (Fla. 1993), affd in part
sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
193. Id. at 677-78.
194. Id. at 678.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 676-77.
197. Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 716, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
198. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516,2547 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Justice Scalia criticized the decision concerning noise restriction
as ineffective2 "° because the majority's cited case, NLRB v. Baptist
Hospital,"2 concerned a hospital regulation as opposed to an injunction. 3 However, ignoring the inaccurate statement in the opinion referring to Baptist Hospital as concerning an injunction, 2 °4 the Court's
argument is still valid. Where Graynedv. City of Rockford2 05 allowed
noise restrictions to be based upon a place's normal activities, 0 6 Baptist Hospital established that noise restrictions around a medical facil-

ity are proper.20 7 Analogizing this argument to Madsen, the argument
is sound and Justice Scalia's criticism is wasted.

Justice Scalia concluded his attempt to invalidate the first part of
the majority's new test by positing that, because no Florida law or

injunction was violated, no significant government interest was present.203 With this conclusion, he apparently suggests that the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and federal case law20 9 are not worthy

of protection by an injunction.
Concerning the second part of the majority's new test regarding

the thirty-six-foot buffer zone, Justice Scalia correctly observed that
there were other options which would have been less burdensome to
speech. 210 He did, however, fail to consider National Society of Pro2 1 This case indicates that previfessional Engineers v. United States.

ous violations are properly considered when fashioning an injunctive
remedy and that the curtailing of other liberties by the resulting injunction may be a necessary result of such previous violations

12

Therefore, although Justice Scalia's criticism has some merit, it fails to
properly consider the previous violations of the Petitioners and, consequently, appears to be invalid.
201. Justice Scalia indicated that the cite to Grayned was improper because Grayned concerned a statute and not an injunction. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2547 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). Justice Scalia criticized the majority's cite to
NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773 (1979), claiming it did not concern any violation of free
speech. Id.
202. 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
203. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2547.
204. Id. at 2528. An examination of NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773 (1979), shows that
Justice Scalia is correct in his observation.
205. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
206. Id. at 116.
207. See NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 442 U.S. 773, 783-84 (1979).
208. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2548 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. L; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
210. Justice Scalia suggested that the Court could have forbidden the picketers from walking
on the street or could have limited the number of protesters. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2548.
211. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
212. Id. at 697.
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Justice Scalia's final criticisms of the majority's decision include a
blanket critique of all place restrictions upon free speech213 and an
attempt to equate the instant matter with the unconstitutional internment of Japanese-Americans in World War 11.214 The first criticism is
invalid, as demonstrated by the significant number of cases which recognize the validity of such restrictions. 1 The second is an obvious
attempt to play upon the reader's emotions concerning the past illegal
acts of the government of the United States. Because of the innumerable differences between the facts in Madsen and circumstances surrounding events duringWorld War II, such a comparison is simply
impossible.
For some reason, Justice Scalia did not attack the majority decision regarding the thirty-six-foot buffer zone on public property as violative of symbolic speech.216 Given that demonstrations, absent
other factors, have been considered protected by the First Amendment, 217 this may have been a more effective criticism.
The intensity of Justice Scalia's dissent also presents problems.
The fact that Justice Scalia is acknowledged as an intelligent and accomplished jurist 1 s will lend credibility to his dissent despite its obvious flaws in logic and authority.2 19 Since Madsen was decided with
just five Justices completely concurring,2 0 with two other Justices
joining Justice Scalia,22' and another Justice dissenting on other
grounds,' the authority of the decision is further diminished.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this note, it was stated: "This note will examine the status of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause in light
of this decision." In fact, Madsen will have little effect on the First
213. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2549 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. See; e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).

216. Peaceful picketing is protected by the First Amendment. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131, 142 (1966). But it cannot block access to buildings. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617

(1968).
217. See Brown, 383 U.S. at 142; Cameron, 390 U.S. at 617.
218. See William W. Fisher III, The Trouble With Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1393 (1993)
(referring to Justice Scalia as "[T]he intellectual leader of the conservative wing of the Supreme

Court").
219. See supra part III.B.
220. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2520 (1994).
221. Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined with Justice Scalia, concurring in part and
dissenting in part to the judgment. Id. at 2534.
222. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Amendment. However, the effects of this decision will implicitly
weigh against the right to an abortion.
Given the outcry against the recent half-hearted following of Roe
v. Wade in Casey v. PlannedParenthood,and given this weak decision
by the Court "protecting" women seeking abortions, Madsen will
likely be viewed as an additional indication that support for a woman's right to an abortion is eroding. Justice Scalia was correct in his
statement and resulting implication that since abortion is the background of this case only problems, and not solutions, will result.
One of the implications of Justice Scalia's dissent is that it will
possibly lead to a further erosion of a woman's right to abortion. As
Professor Nadine Strossen recently observed at the Warren Court
Conference, 3 even though the right of free speech has been on paper
since 1791, it required a Court of Justices to breath life into it. The
corollary to this statement is that it will require a Court of Justices to
destroy it. Madsen did not destroy the right to abortion, but dissents
such as this, hiding behind the rubric of preserving other rights, from a
Justice of Scalia's stature, will never preserve a right.
Given that the Supreme Court is clearly moving in a conservative
direction and accepting that Justice Scalia is the Apostle-Apparent of
the conservative voice on the Court, Justice Scalia's dissent is likely a
harbinger of decisions to come. Even though Justice Scalia "lost" this
round, the next round may yet see the complete reversal of Roe v.
Wade. Justice Scalia's dissent may well be the voice of Cassandra
prophesizing defeat3 4 But will anyone listen?
The new test presented by the Supreme Court is not really a new
test nor is it a significant change in the law. It is a conglomeration of
several old tests. It borrows one part - burdens no more speech than
necessary - from the test previously used for injunctions as specified in
Califano v. Yamasaki. -a This part can also be considered merely a
restatement of the overbroadness doctrine and/or the least restrictive
means test. It borrows the second part - serves a significant government interest - from Perry EducationAssociation v. Perry Local Educators' Association, which defined free speech analysis in the context
of time, place, and manner.
223. Professor Nadine Strossen, Address at The University of Tulsa College of Law Warren
Court Conference (Oct. 17, 1994) (transcript available in The University of Tulsa College of Law

Library).
224. In ancient Greek mythology, Cassandra was a prophetess fated by the Gods never to be
believed. WEBsTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DicoNARY 212 (9th ed. 1991).
225. 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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This decision does serve a significant function in that it formalizes
the procedure to be used when evaluating injunctions in the context of
free speech. However, because the Court failed to present a large majority and because the Court did not protect all the rights that should
have been protected, doubt and uncertainty will reign whenever a
controversial issue such as abortion is presented for review in the context of free speech and injunctions.
William C. Plouffe, Jr.
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